ClawAudit verdict
use-dingding
Accesses system credential store AND makes external network calls
DingTalk enterprise workspace CLI skill with explicit security warnings to review the installer script before running and to use dry-run first; credentials are stored via secure keychain, not logged — legitimate enterprise integration.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. ClawAudit flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
What it does
These are capability combinations: each listed behavior occurs in the skill, but ClawAudit detects co-occurrence — it does not verify that one flows into another. Read the code to confirm a live chain.
Accesses system credential store AND makes external network calls
LLM02 · ASI03
Permission integrity
network_out
Findings (5)
Pipe-to-shell pattern (curl | sh) — supply chain attack vector
SKILL.md · code · curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/DingTalk-Real-AI/dingtalk-workspace
Pipe to sh — executes piped content as shell commands
SKILL.md · code · | sh
Accesses system credential store
SKILL.md · code · Keychain
HTTP request to bare IP address — common in malicious payloads
references/global-reference.md · code · http://127.0.0.1
subprocess execution — runs system commands from Python
scripts/calendar_free_slot_finder.py · prose · downgraded · subprocess.run(
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class A/D/E). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.
network_outcredential_store Thanks — recorded.