Caveat verdict

vlan-linux-client

88
🟢 Trusted
No high-risk patterns surfaced by the deep scan — automated capability review, not behavioral proof.

VLAN.CN Linux client management skill; the curl|sh is the official vendor install script and the truncated 'sudo rm -rf /' in the uninstall section is an artifact of content truncation mid-path, not a destructive command — context is clearly a legitimate uninstall FAQ.

⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.

Automated static analysis — not a human review. Caveat flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.

0
security
50
transparency
70
maintenance

Permission integrity

Makes network requests but does not declare curl/wget in required binaries

network_out

Findings (4)

Pattern match critical

Pipe-to-shell pattern (curl | sh) — supply chain attack vector

SKILL.md · code · curl -kfsSL http://dl.vlan.cn/vlan2.0/linux/install.sh | sh

Pattern match critical

Pipe to sh — executes piped content as shell commands

SKILL.md · code · | sh

Pattern match critical

Recursive delete from root or home — destructive command

SKILL.md · code · rm -rf /

Pattern match high

References sudo — requests elevated privileges

SKILL.md · code · sudo

Why the tier is capped

Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class A/B). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.

Permissions & capabilities

No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.

network_out

Is this flag fair?

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