Caveat verdict
vlog-auto-edit
Receives external input AND executes processes
AI-powered travel vlog auto-editing workflow using Whisper, Pillow, ffmpeg, and a visual API; instructs checking for existing packages before creating venv — responsible local video processing.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. Caveat flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
What it does
These are capability combinations: each listed behavior occurs in the skill, but Caveat detects co-occurrence — it does not verify that one flows into another. Read the code to confirm a live chain.
Receives external input AND executes processes — the shape of a command & control channel
LLM05 · LLM06 · ASI10
Writes files AND executes processes — may drop and execute malicious scripts
LLM05 · LLM06 · ASI05
Reads local files AND makes external network calls — the capabilities for data exfiltration co-occur (data-flow not verified)
LLM02 · LLM06 · ASI03
Reads files, encodes data, AND makes external network calls — the obfuscated-exfiltration pattern (data-flow not verified)
LLM02 · ASI03
Executes processes AND makes external network calls — may exfiltrate command output
LLM02 · LLM06 · ASI03
Accesses credentials AND makes external network calls — potential credential theft
LLM02 · ASI03
Accesses credentials AND encodes data — may obfuscate stolen credentials
LLM02 · ASI03 · ASI04
Installs packages AND executes processes — opaque dependency chain with execution
LLM03 · ASI04
Accesses credentials AND writes files — may persist stolen credentials locally
LLM02 · LLM06 · ASI03
Both reads and writes files — verify scope is limited to intended directories
LLM06 · ASI02
Permission integrity
network_out
credential_access
package_install
Findings (6)
Pipe to python — executes piped content as Python code
SKILL.md · code · | python3
Possible hardcoded credential
SKILL.md · code · API_KEY = 'YOUR_API_KEY
subprocess execution — runs system commands from Python
SKILL.md · code · subprocess.run(
subprocess with shell=True — command injection vector
SKILL.md · code · subprocess.run(cmd, shell=True
<script> tag in markdown — potential code injection
scripts/gen_dashboard.py · prose · downgraded · <script>
Python urllib.request — network access
SKILL.md · code · urllib.request
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class D). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.
package_installnetwork_outnetwork_infile_readcredential_accessdata_encodingprocess_execfile_write Thanks — recorded.