ClawAudit verdict
walvis
The skill manages knowledge without malicious behavior.
⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. ClawAudit flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
Findings (10)
Instructs covert action — may act without user awareness
SKILL.md · prose · downgraded · Silently
Dynamic import() — loads module at runtime
bin/cli.js · prose · downgraded · import('
References child_process — can spawn system processes
bin/cli.js · prose · downgraded · child_process
Accesses OpenClaw config/secrets directly
CLAUDE.md · prose · downgraded · ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json
Uses exec() — may execute shell commands
extensions/walvis-fastpath/index.js · prose · downgraded · exec(
Base64 decode (atob) — may hide malicious payloads
skill/scripts/walrus-sync.ts · prose · downgraded · atob(
Popular HTTP library — network access
SKILL.md · prose · downgraded · Got
Blob URL — may embed executable content
extensions/walvis-fastpath/index.js · prose · downgraded · blob:
Accesses sensitive environment variables
skill/scripts/analyze.ts · prose · downgraded · process.env.WALVIS_LLM_API_KEY
Base64 encoding/decoding
skill/scripts/types.ts · prose · downgraded · Base64-encode
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class D). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.
data_encoding Is this flag fair?
Thanks — recorded.