ClawAudit verdict
wecom-gui-message
Uses standard macOS automation tools (peekaboo, cliclick, screencapture, Swift Vision OCR) to send messages via WeCom desktop client; all capabilities are transparently documented and match the stated purpose.
⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. ClawAudit flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
Findings (2)
subprocess execution — runs system commands from Python
scripts/send_message.py · prose · downgraded · subprocess.run(
subprocess with shell=True — command injection vector
scripts/send_message.py · prose · downgraded · subprocess.run(cmd, shell=True
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class D). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.
Is this flag fair?
Thanks — recorded.