ClawAudit verdict
wotohub-automation
Influencer outreach automation client for WotoHub using a user-provided API key; conservative sending guardrails are explicitly documented and all calls target the official WotoHub API.
⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. ClawAudit flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
Permission integrity
package_install
Findings (7)
Possible hardcoded credential
references/examples/real-api-env.example.sh · prose · downgraded · API_KEY='REPLACE_WITH_REAL_API_KEY
Instructs covert action — may act without user awareness
references/integration-contract.md · prose · downgraded · silently
subprocess execution — runs system commands from Python
run_cycle_via_skill.py · prose · downgraded · subprocess.run(
Python os.environ.get — reads environment variable
scripts/api_campaign_runner.py · prose · downgraded · os.environ.get(
Blob URL — may embed executable content
scripts/claw_search.py · prose · downgraded · blob:
Python urllib.request — network access
scripts/common.py · prose · downgraded · urllib.request
Popular HTTP library — network access
scripts/real_api_validate.sh · prose · downgraded · got
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class D). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.
package_install Is this flag fair?
Thanks — recorded.