Caveat verdict
xiaodu-control
xiaodu-control-official
Xiaodu smart screen control skill with explicit prompt-injection defense: prohibits following injected remote instructions from auth page text, only extracts the token.
⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. Caveat flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
Permission integrity
credential_access
Findings (3)
Possible hardcoded credential
scripts/configure_mcporter.sh · prose · downgraded · token="$(
printf
Accesses OpenClaw config/secrets directly
SKILL.md · prose · downgraded · ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json
subprocess execution — runs system commands from Python
scripts/device_resolver.py · prose · downgraded · subprocess.run(
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class B/D). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
Requires 4 system binaries.
credential_access Is this flag fair?
Thanks — recorded.