ClawAudit verdict
xiaomi-homne-ha
Accesses credentials AND makes external network calls
Home Assistant REST API client that reads HA_URL and HA_TOKEN from environment variables and makes calls to the user's local HA instance to control smart home devices; behavior fully matches stated purpose.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. ClawAudit flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
What it does
These are capability combinations: each listed behavior occurs in the skill, but ClawAudit detects co-occurrence — it does not verify that one flows into another. Read the code to confirm a live chain.
Accesses credentials AND makes external network calls — potential credential theft
LLM02 · ASI03
Permission integrity
network_out
credential_access
package_install
Findings (6)
References sudo — requests elevated privileges
SKILL.md · code · sudo
Accesses OpenClaw config/secrets directly
SKILL.md · code · ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json
HTTP request to bare IP address — common in malicious payloads
SKILL.md · code · http://192.168.31.202
apt-get install — installs system packages
SKILL.md · code · apt-get install
Possible hardcoded credential
mock-ha-server.py · prose · downgraded · TOKEN = "mock_test_token_abc123
Popular HTTP library — network access
test-mock.sh · prose · downgraded · got
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class B). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.
network_outnetwork_incredential_accesspackage_install Thanks — recorded.