ClawAudit verdict

xiaomi-mimo-tts

45
🟠 Risky
Significant concerns — only install if you understand the risks

The skill has been flagged with an execution sink which could potentially be used for malicious purposes.

⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.

Automated static analysis — not a human review. ClawAudit flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.

50
security
80
transparency
80
maintenance

Findings (7)

Pattern match high

Possible hardcoded credential

scripts/_env.sh · prose · downgraded · API_KEY="${MIMO_API_KEY}

Pattern match medium

References child_process — can spawn system processes

scripts/base/mimo_tts.js · prose · downgraded · child_process

Pattern match medium

subprocess execution — runs system commands from Python

scripts/base/mimo_tts.py · prose · downgraded · subprocess.run(

Pattern match low

Accesses sensitive environment variables

scripts/base/mimo_tts.js · prose · downgraded · process.env.XIAOMI_API_KEY

Pattern match low

Node http/https module — low-level network access

scripts/base/mimo_tts.js · prose · downgraded · require('https')

Pattern match low

Python urllib.request — network access

scripts/base/mimo_tts.py · prose · downgraded · urllib.request

Pattern match low

Python os.environ.get — reads environment variable

scripts/base/mimo_tts.py · prose · downgraded · os.environ.get(

Why the tier is capped

Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class B/D). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.

Permissions & capabilities

No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.

Is this flag fair?

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