Caveat verdict

agent-deployment

xiaozhua-agent-deployment

45
🟠 Risky
Significant risk patterns flagged — automated deep scan, not behavioral proof.

The deployment instructions explicitly use `curl -o- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/nvm-sh/nvm/v0.40.3/install.sh | bash` which executes remotely fetched code, a known supply-chain risk even when the source is a well-known project.

⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.

Automated static analysis — not a human review. Caveat flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.

0
security
60
transparency
70
maintenance

Permission integrity

Makes network requests but does not declare curl/wget in required binaries

network_out

Installs packages at runtime — transitive dependencies are not auditable

package_install

Findings (5)

Pattern match critical

Pipe-to-shell pattern (curl | sh) — supply chain attack vector

SKILL.md · code · curl -o- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/nvm-sh/nvm/v0.40.3/install.sh | bash

Pattern match critical

Pipe to bash — executes piped content as shell commands

SKILL.md · code · | bash

Pattern match high

References sudo — requests elevated privileges

SKILL.md · code · sudo

Pattern match high

Accesses OpenClaw config/secrets directly

SKILL.md · code · ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json

Pattern match medium

HTTP request to bare IP address — common in malicious payloads

SKILL.md · prose · downgraded · http://127.0.0.1

Why the tier is capped

Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class A). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.

Permissions & capabilities

No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.

network_outpackage_install

Is this flag fair?

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