Caveat verdict
zrise-connect-release
The Lobster setup instructions clone an external GitHub repository (github.com/openclaw/lobster) directly into /tmp and immediately install and execute it, introducing unverified third-party code into the agent's execution environment.
⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. Caveat flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
Permission integrity
package_install
Findings (10)
Pipe to python — executes piped content as Python code
SKILL.md · code · | python3
Possible hardcoded credential
docs/TELEGRAM_INTEGRATION.md · code · token = "YOUR_BOT_TOKEN
Uses spawn() — can execute external programs
docs/SIMPLE_WORKFLOW_GUIDE.md · code · spawn(
Accesses OpenClaw config/secrets directly
docs/SIMPLE_WORKFLOW_GUIDE.md · code · ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json
References webhook/callback URL
docs/TELEGRAM_INTEGRATION.md · code · webhook_url
HTTP request to bare IP address — common in malicious payloads
scripts/execute_ai_task.py · prose · downgraded · http://127.0.0.1
subprocess execution — runs system commands from Python
scripts/execute_ai_task.py · prose · downgraded · subprocess.run(
References agent configuration files
scripts/agent_selector.py · prose · downgraded · agent_config
Python os.environ.get — reads environment variable
scripts/execute_ai_task.py · prose · downgraded · os.environ.get(
References agent memory files
scripts/zrise_utils.py · prose · downgraded · MEMORY.md
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class D). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.
package_install Is this flag fair?
Thanks — recorded.