Caveat verdict
zstack-mcp
ZStack Cloud MCP server integration for querying cloud infrastructure APIs; write operations require explicit opt-in, network access is to the user own ZStack server.
⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. Caveat flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
Permission integrity
network_out
package_install
Findings (3)
Possible hardcoded credential
scripts/configure.sh · prose · downgraded · token=' in cookie:
session = cookie.split(
Pipe to python — executes piped content as Python code
scripts/test-connection.sh · prose · downgraded · | python3
HTTP request to bare IP address — common in malicious payloads
SKILL.md · prose · downgraded · http://172.20.0.36
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class B). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.
network_inpackage_installnetwork_out Is this flag fair?
Thanks — recorded.