Caveat verdict

ZTP

ztp

88
🟢 Trusted
No high-risk patterns surfaced by the deep scan — automated capability review, not behavioral proof.

Zero Trust security audit skill that runs static analysis tools on user-provided code before integration; explicitly states never run untrusted code and focuses on scanning, not execution.

⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.

Automated static analysis — not a human review. Caveat flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.

0
security
90
transparency
70
maintenance

Findings (11)

Pattern match high

Uses eval() — can execute arbitrary code

scripts/shield_pro.py · prose · downgraded · eval(

Pattern match high

<script> tag in markdown — potential code injection

scripts/shield_pro.py · prose · downgraded · <script>

Pattern match high

Possible hardcoded credential

tests/test_integration.py · prose · downgraded · secret = 'axz123!@#$QWERTYUIOPASDFGHJKLZXCVBNMqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnm

Pattern match high

Recursive delete from root or home — destructive command

tests/test_integration.py · prose · downgraded · rm -rf /

Pattern match high

Dynamic __import__('os') — Python OS command execution

tests/test_shield.py · prose · downgraded · __import__('os')

Pattern match medium

References child_process — can spawn system processes

scripts/shield_pro.py · prose · downgraded · child_process

Pattern match medium

os.system/popen — direct OS command execution

scripts/shield_pro.py · prose · downgraded · os.popen(

Pattern match medium

HTTP request to bare IP address — common in malicious payloads

tests/test_integration.py · prose · downgraded · http://1.2.3.4

Pattern match medium

Uses exec() — may execute shell commands

tests/test_shield.py · prose · downgraded · exec(

Pattern match low

Python urllib.request — network access

scripts/shield_pro.py · prose · downgraded · urllib.request

Pattern match low

Python os.getenv — reads environment variable

scripts/shield_pro.py · prose · downgraded · os.getenv(

Why the tier is capped

Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class D). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.

Permissions & capabilities

No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.

Is this flag fair?

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