ClawAudit verdict
zulip-bridge
Zulip bridge skill providing messaging and stream monitoring via the OpenClaw Zulip plugin; requires explicit admin flag for destructive actions and respects mention-gating by default.
⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. ClawAudit flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
Findings (8)
Possible hardcoded credential
test/accounts.test.ts · prose · downgraded · API_KEY = "env-api-key
Accesses sensitive system files
test/path-traversal.test.ts · prose · downgraded · /etc/passwd
Accesses OpenClaw config/secrets directly
SKILL.md · prose · downgraded · ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json
References child_process — can spawn system processes
scripts/check-bootstrap.js · prose · downgraded · child_process
Uses exec() — may execute shell commands
src/actions.ts · prose · downgraded · exec(
Gopher protocol — SSRF attack vector
src/zulip/probe.ts · prose · downgraded · gopher://
Accesses sensitive environment variables
src/setup-surface.ts · prose · downgraded · process.env.ZULIP_API_KEY
Opens WebSocket connection
types/openclaw-plugin-sdk.d.ts · prose · downgraded · WebSocket
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class B/D). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.
Is this flag fair?
Thanks — recorded.