Caveat verdict
zz-chat
The skill deploys a Worker under the user's own Cloudflare account and registers with a central external server (ai0000.cn), creating persistent bridge infrastructure that routes user messages through an external party's coordination system.
⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. Caveat flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
Permission integrity
network_out
file_read+write
package_install
Findings (8)
Pipe-to-python pattern — remote code execution risk
SKILL.md · code · curl -s "$WORKER_URL/register" | python
Pipe to python — executes piped content as Python code
SKILL.md · code · | python3
<script> tag in markdown — potential code injection
SKILL.md · code · <script>
Opens WebSocket connection
SKILL.md · code · WebSocket
References child_process — can spawn system processes
bridge.js · prose · downgraded · child_process
subprocess execution — runs system commands from Python
bridge.py · prose · downgraded · subprocess.run(
Python urllib.request — network access
bridge.py · prose · downgraded · urllib.request
Python os.environ.get — reads environment variable
bridge.py · prose · downgraded · os.environ.get(
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class C/D). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.
package_installnetwork_outfile_writedata_encoding Is this flag fair?
Thanks — recorded.